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Summary
This report provides a current summary of ballistic and cruise missile activity
in selected countries and discusses implications for U.S. national security policy.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms of
Reference Handbook defines a ballistic missile as “a missile that is guided during
powered flight and unguided during free flight when the trajectory that it follows is
subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag” and a cruise
missile as “a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air,
sea, and land.”  Ballistic and cruise missile development and proliferation continue
to pose a threat to U.S. national security interests both at home and abroad.
Approximately 35 countries currently possess operational ballistic missiles of various
ranges and approximately 25 countries have operational cruise missiles with a range
greater than 150 km (90 miles).  Some analysts consider cruise missile proliferation
to be of more concern than that of ballistic missile proliferation, primarily due to
their low threshold of use, availability, affordability, and accuracy.  This report will
be updated annually.
With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya’s ballistic missile
program, many view North Korean and Iranian missile and WMD programs as the
primary “rogue nation” long-range ballistic missile threat to U.S. national security.
Russia and China continue to be the only two countries that could conceivably attack
the United States with intercontinental ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons,
but improved relationships with both countries have done a great deal to diminish
this threat over past decades.  India’s and Pakistan’s ongoing missile development
programs are viewed by many as highly aggressive and even provocative, but are
generally viewed in a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the United
States.  The renewal of dialogue between these two countries in an attempt to settle
their disputes by diplomatic means may also help in slowing proliferation as well as
preventing their potential use in this region.  
The implications of  ballistic and cruise missile proliferation to the United States
has necessitated both nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches in trying
to stem the development, deployment, and export of missiles.  Past Administrations
have been characterized as nonproliferation-oriented by some analysts while the
current Bush Administration is viewed by some as having abandoned traditional
nonproliferation for a  more action-oriented approach towards missile proliferation.
Other experts have suggested that the United States must somehow find the right
balance between missile nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies if
meaningful, long-term progress is to be made. While some believe that missile
proliferation can be “rolled back” by some combination of these approaches, others
note that both ballistic and cruise missiles have become such an integral part of many
countries’ national security frameworks, that it is highly unlikely that countries will
abandon their programs in deference to U.S. pressure. 
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Introduction
Foreign ballistic and cruise missiles pose a potential threat to the national
security interests of the United States.  While weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
can be delivered by a variety of means including aircraft, artillery, and asymmetric
means, it is missile-delivered WMDs that garner the most domestic and international
attention.  Countries with a WMD missile capability have the potential to influence
the actions of other countries in their regions or even countries on another continent
and, in some cases,  destroy population centers and national infrastructure.  At the
present time, the United States is within range of the ballistic missiles of Russia,
China, and perhaps North Korea, as well as France and the United Kingdom.  Several
other countries have missiles within range of U.S. overseas facilities and interests.
A number of countries are attempting to either procure or develop longer-range
ballistic missiles to accurately deliver WMDs over great distances and many fear that
one day such an attack may be launched against the United States by a regional
power or rogue state where stringent political and military controls over these
weapons are not exercised.  
Estimates of the missile threat to the United States continue to be controversial
for a number of reasons.  One is that many missile programs have moved
underground and can also be hidden in a country’s civilian space or aerospace
industry, making it much harder for intelligence organizations to track development.
There is also some controversy still surrounding the 1995 National Intelligence
Estimate and 1998’s Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States (P.L. 104-201) also known as the Rumsfeld Commission Report.
Despite numerous recent developments in missile programs world-wide, the
Rumsfeld Commission Report continues in 2005 to be the open source benchmark
for missile proliferation.  While there is still disagreement about the extent of the
missile threat, the Bush Administration’s unwavering commitment to ballistic missile
defense has resulted in the deployment of ballistic missile interceptors at Ft. Greely,
Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.1
CRS-2
2 Ballistic missiles are classified by their range as follows:
SRBM = Short-range ballistic missile, 70-1,000 km (43-620 mi.)
MRBM = Medium-range ballistic missile, 1,000-3,000 km (620-1,860 mi.)
IRBM = Intermediate-range ballistic missile, 3,000-5,500 km (1,860-3,410 mi.)
ICBM = Intercontinental ballistic missile, 5,500 km + (3,410 mi. +)
SLBM = Submarine launched ballistic missile, can be any range but tend to be in the
intermediate to intercontinental range.
    Cruise missile abbreviations:
ALCM = Air-launched cruise missile.
ASM = Anti-ship missile.
CM = Cruise missile (generic).
LACM = Land attack cruise missile.
SLCM = Submarine-launched cruise missile.
3  “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” National Air Intelligence Center, Sept. 2000, p. 15.
4 Joseph Cirincione, The Declining Ballistic Missile Threat, 2005, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Feb. 2005.
5 Ibid., p. 5
Estimates released by the U.S. Intelligence Community vary little from those
issued in the late 1990s by the Rumsfeld Committee.  Iran is still assessed as being
capable of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)2 capable of
reaching the United States by 20153 although in the 1995 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) most intelligence agencies believed that this could happen before
2015.  The NIE also cites  North Korea as posing an ICBM threat to the United States
before 2015.  Likewise,  North Korea’s ballistic missile development time lines may
need to be re-evaluated as new missile programs are apparently underway.  While not
posing a direct threat to the United States, the proliferation of shorter range ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles has resulted in heightened regional tensions in the
Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and between China and Taiwan. 
A Declining Ballistic Missile Threat?
Some maintain that the long-range ballistic missile threat has decreased
significantly since the Cold War, primarily due to nonproliferation treaties and
arrangements.4  The most significant reduction, they argue, are in ICBMs, SLBMs,
IRBMs, and MRBMs, and that even SRBMs are “beginning to decrease as aging
inventories are retired.”5  Given these decreases, the threat is characterized by some
as follows:
! There is a widespread capability to launch short-range missiles;
! There is a slowly growing, but limited, capability to launch medium-
range missiles;
! A decreasing number of long-range missiles from Cold War levels
that will continue to drop significantly over the next fifteen years;
! A possibility that one or two new nations could acquire a limited
capability to launch long-range missiles over the next two decades;
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6 Ibid., p. 10.
7 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 15.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
! Likelihood of a nation attacking the United States or Europe with a
ballistic missile is exceptionally low.6
Others also note the increase in SRBMs - particularly in the 100 to 200 km
range - as well an increase in programs that modify existing surface-to-surface
unguided rockets with guidance and control sections, which adds a further low-cost
SRBM capability.7  Ballistic missiles are also considered “less expensive to maintain
than an air force,” and since “technologies can be transferred across to satellite
launch vehicles, earning hard currency,” some analysts suggest that these factors will
insure the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles.8  Given this possibility of
increased proliferation, some conjecture that the “ballistic missile and nuclear
warhead threat situation is going to become more complex and international in
nature, with whole regions likely to be involved rather than just individual
countries.”9 
Missile Production and Development Facilities  
One significant trend is the increasing number of missile production and
development facilities.  Fifteen countries are known to produce ballistic missiles:  the
United States, France, Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, India,
Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Syria, Ukraine, and Argentina. Several other countries,
including Germany, Japan, Great Britain, South Africa, and Brazil could produce
ballistic missiles but have chosen not to.  When a country has a missile production
facility, its ability to produce large quantities of missiles is limited only by its ability
to obtain certain critical materials and components.  When a country acquires a large
number of missiles and launchers, it may be able to launch sustained attacks and to
overwhelm missile defense systems.  Production and research facilities also enable
these regional powers to enhance the range, accuracy, destructiveness, and missile
defense penetration aids of their missiles.  Another important factor is that countries
with an indigenous missile production capability also avoid export control
restrictions when trying to import missiles and missile technology from outside
sources.  Finally, once a country produces missiles it can consider exporting them as
well as the production technology to still more countries for financial, political, or
ideological rewards.  North Korea has been exporting missiles and missile production
facilities for a number of years, and there is concern that more countries will enter the
missile market as suppliers.  Russian and Chinese organizations have been primary
sources of missile technology and, in the past, Western firms also have transferred
missile technology.
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10 See also CRS Report RL30699, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and
Missiles: Status and Trends.
11 See also CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:How Soon an Arsenal?
and CRS Report RS21592, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments. 
12 See also CRS Report 98-103, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic
Missiles: The State of Proliferation. (Out of print; available from author at 7-7673.) 
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warheads10
The primary cause for concern with missile proliferation is that missile systems
can provide countries an effective vehicle for delivering nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons over long distances.  The most worrisome trend is the growing
number of countries with both long-range missile and WMD programs.   India and
Pakistan have tested MRBMs and nuclear explosive devices.  North Korea, Iran, and
Israel are suspected to have nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs as
well as a variety of short and medium range missiles.
Over the last several years, nuclear weapons programs have declined in number.
South Africa reportedly dismantled the nuclear weapons and missiles that it had
developed.  Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan also abandoned earlier
nuclear weapon programs.  Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine transferred to Russia
the nuclear weapons they inherited from the Soviet Union.  Recent revelations about
the possibility of North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and Iran’s
revitalized nuclear program could reverse this favorable trend.11
Several other countries that have missiles also have chemical weapons, and
some have chemical warheads for their missiles.  Bulk filled chemical warheads for
shorter-range ballistic missiles are considered relatively easy to develop while
chemical submunitions are considered somewhat more challenging. Biological
warheads are considered fairly difficult to develop because of the difficulties
associated with working with biological agents in terms of their sensitivity to
environmental conditions during missile flight and upon dispersal.It has been
reported that during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had missile warheads filled with a
variety of nerve agents and others with botulinum toxin and anthrax.  China, Egypt,
India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Korea,
Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam, all have missiles and reportedly have chemical
weapons.  Several countries reportedly have biological weapons programs, including
China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia.12
Ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive warheads proved to
be important weapons of terror when used against cities in the Iran-Iraq war and the
1991 Gulf War.  The development of advanced conventional warheads, such as
cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives, and enhanced missile reliability and accuracy
will increase the military effectiveness of missiles armed with conventional
warheads.  The United States has demonstrated  the military effectiveness of cruise
CRS-5
13 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” p. 23.
14 Countries that adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime  agree to restrict
transfers of missiles that can deliver a 500 kg warhead 300 kilometers, and related
technology, components, and material.  A relatively crude, early generation nuclear warhead
is estimated to weigh about 500 kg.  Countries other than the United States that are currently
reported to have missiles that meet the MTCR thresholds are: Afghanistan, Algeria,
Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, France, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan,
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Syria, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, Vietnam, and Yemen.  Additionally, India, South Korea, and Taiwan are in the
advanced stages of developing indigenous missiles with a range of 300 km or more.
missiles in several conflicts and a new generation of stealthy, more capable cruise
missiles is presently in development in a number of countries.13
The Demand for Missiles and WMD 
As missiles and missile production technology have become widely available,
the demand for longer-range missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads
has increased.  Because of their relatively low cost, ability to penetrate defenses,
strike deep into an enemy’s homeland, and to deliver nuclear or biological weapons
that could threaten the survival of an enemy country, missiles have become a delivery
system of choice and a symbol of national might for some countries.  
The technological and military prowess of the United States was demonstrated
for the world during the 1991 Gulf War and again in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF).  As a result, adversarial countries and non-state groups may be more
likely to avoid direct conventional military confrontation with the United States.
Some potential  adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, continue to develop
missiles and WMD as means to counter U.S. military strength in their region and to
intimidate or deter their neighbors.  At the same time, several allies and neutral
countries are also building missiles and developing WMD to promote their perceived
national security interests. 
Any stigma associated with the possession or use of missiles was significantly
reduced by the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghan War, the Gulf War, Chinese intimidation
of Taiwan, Russian use in its Chechen conflicts, and by U.S. use of cruise missiles
in Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Sudan.  In regional wars, missile attacks and
artillery fire on civilian population centers have become a standard form of combat,
as the use of standoff weapons (usually cruise missiles or air-to-surface guided
weapons) against  hostile military units, intelligence centers, terrorist camps, and
WMD facilities has become a commonly-accepted U.S. military practice.
Status of Missile Proliferation
About three dozen countries have been publicly identified as having ballistic
missiles, and half of those countries are in Asia and the Middle East (see Table 1).
About 30 of these countries have, or are developing, ballistic missiles that can deliver
a 500-kilogram warhead 300 kilometers or further.14  Of the non-European countries,
fourteen have produced ballistic missiles (Argentina, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq,
CRS-6
15 See also CRS Report RL31848, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC): Background
and Issues for Congress.
Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Ukraine, and South Africa
which no longer produces missiles).  In addition to these regional powers, which are
often discussed as missile proliferators, several Western and Eastern European
countries and republics of the former Soviet Union have missiles.   
International pressures and domestic policy decisions have eliminated certain
missile programs in  Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Poland, Hungary, and former Soviet
Republics.  While the long-standing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
is credited with slowing missile proliferation, it is not known what effect — if any
—  the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)
will have on proliferators.15 
MTCR.  The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the
United Kingdom established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on
April 16, 1987.  The MTCR was designed to slow the proliferation of ballistic and
cruise missiles, rockets, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction.  It is an informal arrangement, not a treaty, consisting
of guidelines for transfers of missiles and related technology, and an annex listing
items to be controlled.  The Regime is based on the premise that foreign acquisition
or development of delivery systems can be delayed and made more difficult and
expensive if major producers restrict exports.  The MTCR has no independent means
to monitor or enforce its guidelines.  Nations adopt the guidelines as national policy
and are responsible for restraining their own missile-related transfers.
ICOC.  On November 25, 2002, ICOC was inaugurated at the Hague, the
Netherlands.  The ICOC, like the MTCR, is not a treaty but instead a set of
“fundamental behavioral norms and a framework for cooperation to address missile
proliferation.”  The ICOC focuses on addressing the demand side of proliferation and
is viewed as complementing the supply side oriented MTCR.  It seeks to achieve
transparency by using confidence building measures, such as information transfer on
ballistic missile programs.  It also calls for pre-launch notification of ballistic missile
flight tests.  Unlike the MTCR, the ICOC intends to establish a formal standing
organization to collect information and oversee the development of its confidence
building measures and information control mechanisms.  
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16 Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia Cuts Arsenal of Strategic Missiles, Jane’s Defense Weekly,
Apr. 13, 2005, p. 15. 
17 Ibid.
18 Mark Galeotti, “Putin Puts Confidence in New Generation of Missiles,” Jane’s
Intelligence Review, Feb. 2005, p. 54. 
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Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus,
Bulgaria, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece,
India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Netherlands,
North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Serbia,
Slovakia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
Vietnam, and Yemen. 
Note: See the Missile Inventory Appendix at the end of this report for a listing of each missile
program by country.
Russia
Russia’s ICBM force - although greatly diminished in size over the years -
continues to pose a significant threat to U.S. national security. Russia reportedly
plans to reduce the number of ICBMs on active duty from 496 at present to 313 by
2010.16  Some experts estimate that by 2010, these 313 ICBMs will consist of 154
silo-based missiles and 159 mobile land versions, and the number of ICBM nuclear
warheads will be cut from 1,770 to 923.17  At the end of 2004, Russia reportedly
made a number of claims about impending deployments in 2005 of new generations
of Russian missiles.18  While specifics were lacking, some speculate that the Russian
government was referring to the following four systems:
Topol-M (SS-27 “Sickle”).  Russia is phasing in the silo and mobile versions
of the Topol-M to replace a variety of older ICBMs — some of which were
CRS-8
19 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, pp. 162-163.
20 “Mobile Topol-M Cleared for Production,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Feb. 1, 2005.
21 Ibid.
22 “Russia Plans New Strategic Missiles,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Jan. 1, 2005.
23 Mark Galeotti, p. 54.
24 Ibid.
25 “Mobile Topol-M Cleared for Production,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, Feb. 1, 2005.
26 Alon Ben-David, “Iskander-E Designed to Counter Western TMDs,” Jane’s Defense
Weekly, Apr. 6, 2005.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
developed in the mid to late 1960s.  The Topol-M — which began development in
the late 1980s   — is widely believed to have a maneuverable reentry vehicle —
possibly including countermeasures — which Russia claims negates U.S. missile
defenses.19 The silo-based version of the Topol-M is currently operational with four
regiments (each regiment has 10 launchers) and a fifth regiment of silo-based
missiles is due to be commissioned in 2005.20  The production of the mobile version
is scheduled to begin in 2005, with between three to nine systems scheduled to enter
service in 2006 and a similar number of systems being developed annually in the
following years.21  Press reports that Russia will develop a new heavy ICBM
successor to the Topol-M  are viewed by many as unlikely to be true, given Russia’s
limited defense budget - a budget that supposedly was responsible for slowing
Topol-M production to only four missiles in 2005.22 
Bulava (SS-N-30).  The Bulava is a submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) that has been in design since 1986.23 This 10 warhead missile is intended to
be used with the new Borey-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, the
first of which is scheduled for launch in 2006.24  The Bulava is also believed to have
a maneuverable warhead and a relatively short burn time, which is intended to make
it less susceptible to boost-phase intercept.25
Iskander (SS-26 “Stone”).  The Iskander, which is reportedly currently
being brought into frontline service in Russia, was designed to defeat Western
ballistic missile defense systems — particularly the U.S. Patriot 2/3 system.26  It
comes in two versions, the “M” version for domestic use with a 400 km range and
the “E” or export version with a reported 200 km range.27  According to the Russian
press, the Iskander has four principal countermeasures: boost phase maneuvering,
depressed trajectory, low radar signature due to construction with composite
materials, and terminal phase maneuvering.  Syria  expressed interest in acquiring
Iskander-Es from Russia in early 200528  but strong protests from Israel — who was
supposedly concerned that the highly accurate and stealthy Iskanders would be used
CRS-9
29 Nikolai Gulko and Maksim Grgorev “Russian Missiles Chill Russian-Israeli
Relations,”Kommersant Daily, Jan. 12, 2005. 
30 Robert Hewson, “Russian Conventional Cruise Missile Enters Service, Jane’s Defense
Weekly, Dec. 15, 2004.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Information in this paragraph is taken from Robert Hewson, “Ukranian Cruise Missile
Transfer Under Scrutiny, Jane’s Defense Weekly, Mar. 30, 2005 and Bill Gertz, “Missiles
Sold to China and Iran,” Washington Times, Apr. 6, 2005.
34 Bill Gertz, “Chinese Military Buildup Assessed as Threat to the U.S.,” Washington Times,
Feb. 18, 2005 and Edward Cody, “China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military,” Washington
Post, Apr. 12, 2005.
35  Solid propellants are generally favored as they are safer to store and easier and quicker
to put into action than liquid propellant-filled missiles.  Countries that produce solid
(continued...)
to either destroy or evade Israel’s Arrow ballistic missile defense system — have
reportedly kept the acquisition from proceeding as intended.29 
Conventional Cruise Missiles. Russia has reportedly deployed its first
conventional air launched cruise missile.30  The Kh-555 is a derivative of its Kh -
55SM nuclear cruise missile and reportedly has a range of between 3,000 and 3,500
km, an accuracy of between 5 to 10 meters, and a 400 kg conventional warhead
capacity.31  These missiles, designed to be carried on Russian long-range strategic
bomber aircraft, are described by Russian press as a weapon for use in “local
conflicts and counter-terrorist operations.”32
A number of unarmed Kh-55 cruise missiles — left in the Ukraine after the
withdrawal of Russian forces — were reportedly illicitly transferred to Iran and
China.33  According to Ukranian government officials, 12 missiles were supplied to
Iran and six missiles to China in 2001.  Some Western analysts believe that more
missiles could have been supplied than the 18 acknowledged by the Ukranian
government and that North Korea might have also received missiles.  Some are
concerned that these Kh-55s could be modified into precision guided Kh-555s and
that they could be modified to be fired from smaller aircraft —  such as SU-24s —
  which would increase the utility of the missile among nations that do not have large,
long- range bomber aircraft.
China
Chinese military modernization has been called “ a threat to the United States”
which could conceivably “alter the regional balance of power” in the Pacific.34  As
part of this overall program, China is putting significant emphasis on missile
programs. 
China’s ICBMs.  China is believed to have a relatively small arsenal of
nuclear-armed, liquid propellant35 ICBMs capable of reaching portions of the United
CRS-10
35 (...continued)
propellant missiles are generally considered to have a more technologically-advanced
missile program than those countries who produce strictly liquid propellant missiles.
36 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence
Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 14. According to
NASIC officials, this is the most current version of this unclassified report but NASIC hopes
to publish an update some time later in 2005. 
37 Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 42, Jan. 2005, p. 42.
38 Ibid.
39 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence
Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12. 
40 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China 2005, publically released on July 19, 2005, p. 28.
41 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence
Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12. 
42 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the
People’s Republic of China 2005, publically released on July 19, 2005, p. 28.
43 Ibid.
44 “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (Unclassified),” National Air and Space Intelligence
Center (NASIC), Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, Aug. 2003, p. 12. 
45 Ibid., p. 14.
States.36  Some experts believe that China has between 20 to 30 CSS-4 — also
known as Dong Feng (DF)-5 — and DF-5A nuclear ICBMs in service and in storage,
although it is possible that these numbers may be low due to the commonality
between these missiles and similar Chinese space launch vehicles.37  It is believed
that the DF-5 series of missiles will  be taken out of action starting in 2005 in favor
of newer, solid propellant missiles.38 
China is continuing its development of its DF-31 road-mobile ICBM, a three-
stage, solid propellant missile carried inside of a canister on a transporter-launcher
vehicle.39  According to the Department of Defense (DOD), the DF-31 will achieve
an initial operational capability (IOC) in 2005-2006.40  The DF-31 is assessed as
being capable of striking targets throughout Europe and Asia, parts of Canada, and
the northwestern United States.41  A longer range DF-31A road mobile version also
is reportedly under development with a projected  IOC of 2007-2009.42  The DF-31A
will enable China to strike almost the entire United States as well as Australia and
New Zealand.43  Some reports suggest that an even longer range DF-41, which could
conceivably range the entire United States, is under development for both road
mobile and silo use.44  Although there have been a number successful test flights of
the DF-31, the DF-31 is not yet believed to be fully in service and some experts
maintain that China will have from 75-100 nuclear warheads on ICBMs capable of
threatening the United States by 2018.45  Some suggest, however, that the main
purpose of China’s ICBM program is not so much the ability to attack and defeat the
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United States but instead to “throw a monkey wrench into the decision-making
process in Washington,” particularly in terms of U.S. intervention in Taiwan.46
Chinese SLBMs.  The Chinese are continuing to develop their JL-2 SLBM
for use in China’s new Type 094 ballistic missile submarine.  The JL-2’s range is
estimated to be approximately 12,000 kilometers and will likely have multiple
warheads.47  The Japanese press reported that China had test-fired what was believed
to be a JL-2 on June16, 2005 from a ballistic missile submarine off the coast of China
near Qingdao to a test area in the western Chinese desert several thousand kilometers
away.48  The Type-094 submarine is believed to be capable of carrying 16 JL-2
SLBMs and, according to one expert, when both systems become fully operational
it will be “China’s first truly intercontinental strategic nuclear delivery system.”49
The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly expects China to put its first
Type-094 submarine with JL-2 SLBMs into service by 2010 with the second entering
service by 2020.50  China currently has a single XIA-class ballistic missile submarine
which can carry 12 CSS-NX-3 SLBMs (range of 1,600 km)51  but the XIA submarine
is considered so “noisy” to underwater detection systems that its chances of evading
attack submarines is considered “limited.”52  According to U.S. intelligence officials,
the Type-094/JL-2 combination will permit China, for the first time, to target
portions of the United States from operating areas near the Chinese coast.53 
Chinese Missiles and Taiwan.  In testimony to the Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 17, 2005, on Current and Projected National Security Threats
to the United States, the Director of the DIA, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby stated:
China also is developing new SRBMs, Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
(MRBMs), and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). They are a key
component of Beijing’s military modernization program. Many of these systems
will be fielded in military regions near Taiwan. In 2004, it added numerous
SRBMs to those already existing in brigades near Taiwan. In addition to key
Taiwanese military and civilian facilities, Chinese missiles will be capable of
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targeting U.S. and allied military installations in the region to either deter outside
intervention in a crisis or attack those installations if deterrent efforts fail.54
There are numerous unclassified estimates of how many ballistic missiles China
has arrayed against Taiwan, with many of these estimates originating from Taiwanese
government officials.  According to DOD55 China has deployed between 650-730
mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs to garrisons opposite Taiwan, with deployments
of these systems increasing by about 100 missiles per year.  Although virtually all of
China’s SRBMs are garrisoned opposite Taiwan, they are mobile and can deploy
throughout China to take up firing positions to support other regional contingencies.
Newer versions of these missiles that are being deployed feature improved range and
accuracy and is believed to be exploring how these and other ballistic missiles can
be used for anti-access and sea-denial purposes.
Chinese Land-Attack Cruise Missiles.  In April 2005, a Taiwanese
intelligence source reported  that China would soon begin to deploy a new, subsonic
land-attack cruise missile (LACM).56  This missile is “expected to approximate the
performance and tactical flexibility of the U.S. RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk and will
eventually be fielded in ground, submarine, ship and air-launched versions.”57  This
missile, known as the “Hong Niao” or HN-class LACM comes in three versions with
the HN-2 version having a 1,800 km range from ground or ships and a 1,400 km
range when fired from a submarine.58  It is also believed that this LACM can carry
both nuclear and conventional payloads.59  According to Taiwanese press reports,
China is expected to deploy some 200 additional LACMs - including the new HN
series - within striking distance of Taiwan by the end of 2006.60 
Satellite Guidance.  China’s participation in the European Union’s (EU)
Galileo satellite navigation system reportedly has some Western defense experts
concerned that China could significantly enhance the accuracy of its ballistic and
cruise missiles and precision-guided munitions.61  The Galileo system is expected to
consist of a network of 30 satellites and ground navigation systems that are intended
to provide a highly accurate navigational system for both civilian and military use
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and is expected to enter service in 2008.62  By increasing the accuracy of its missiles,
China would be able to strike more targets with its missile force with significantly
enhanced accuracy and would not have to employ multiple missiles to insure that
each target is sufficiently covered.
North Korea63
North Korea’s ballistic missile program continues to trouble both the United
States and its allies from a variety of perspectives.  Despite international pressure and
trade sanctions, North Korea is continuing to increase, diversify, and improve its
missile fleet.  In conjunction, North Korea publically declared itself a nuclear power
in 2003 and many analysts believe that its nuclear program is focused on developing
nuclear warheads for both short, medium, and longer-range ballistic missiles. North
Korea is also widely believed to have either acquired or developed chemical and
possibly biological warheads for its ballistic missiles.  North Korea has allegedly
exported ballistic missiles and associated technologies to a number of countries and
some analysts suggest that these transfers have advanced the recipient’s missile
programs by many years.  Finally, North Korea has conducted a number of missile
test firings during and between negotiations, which many analysts feel were intended
to influence the United States and countries in the region.  North Korea’s March
2005 announcement that it was no longer observing a self-imposed moratorium on
long-range missile testing64 has fueled speculation that North Korea may be preparing
to test its longer range missiles.
North Korea’s Missiles.  North Korea’s arsenal consists primarily of shorter-
range Scuds, and a number of longer range No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles.
North Korea is believed to have approximately 700 Scud C (Hwasong 6) SRBMs
with a 500 km range and some analysts believe that a considerable portion of North
Korea’s estimated 250 tons of chemical and biological agents would be delivered by
these missiles.65  North Korea’s Scud-Cs have sufficient range to strike targets
throughout South Korea.  North Korea’s estimated 100, 1,300 km range, No Dong
missiles enable North Korea to strike U.S. military bases in Japan with both
conventional and WMD warheads.66  North Korea launched a version of its Taepo
Dong missile in August 1998 over the Japanese islands, allegedly to put a satellite
into orbit.  Since this launch there has been speculation that other Taepo Dong
versions were under development.
Prior to September 9, 2003 — the 55th anniversary of the founding of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — U.S. and international press speculated
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that North Korea might display a new, longer-range version of the Taepo Dong
missile, as well as an unnamed intermediate range missile, during military parades
held in Pyongyang. U.S. government  officials referred to the allegedly longer-range
version of the Taepo Dong as “Taepo Dong X.”67
According to U.S. intelligence officials, the Taepo Dong X is believed to be
based on the former Soviet Navy SS-N-6 submarine launched ballistic missile that
North Korea may have possibly obtained from Russia between 1992 and 1998.68  An
unnamed congressional source reportedly noted that the Russian Pacific Fleet, which
deployed the SS-N-6, was “desperately disorganized and underfunded” during the
period between 1992 and 1998, suggesting that North Korea might have obtained SS-
N-6 technology from the Russian Navy or the missile’s designer, the Makeyev
Design Bureau, without the knowledge or approval of the Russian government.  
The South Korean press reported on September 8, 2003, that South Korean
intelligence officials had identified what they believed were 10 new intermediate
range ballistic missiles and five launch pads at North Korea’s Mirim Aerodrome.69
South Korean officials also suggested that this new missile had been under
development since the early 1990s and could have a maximum range of 3,600 kms.70
According to the report, Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. intelligence officials
inferred from the shape of the missile that the new North Korean missiles were based
on the Soviet-designed SS-N-6.71  According to one U.S. press report, unnamed U.S.
officials confirmed the accuracy of South Korean press reports and further elaborated
by stating that the unnamed intermediate range ballistic missile was road mobile72,
making these missiles more difficult to locate and destroy.  With the capability to
accommodate a reentry vehicle weighing approximately 1,500 lbs (680 kgs)73 a North
Korean missile derived from the SS-N-6 could conceivably accommodate a heavier
and less sophisticated nuclear weapon — the type which many experts believe North
Korea is capable of producing. 
While there appears to be some disagreement in the ranges for the SS-N-6 and
the possible North Korean SS-N-6 variant (3,000 to 3,600 kilometers, depending on
the source) a missile with a 2,500 kilometer range would enable North Korea to
strike U.S. military forces in Japan and Okinawa and with a 3,500 kilometer range
to strike Guam, a U.S. territory with a substantial and growing U.S. military
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presence.74  If this is the case, such a missile would represent a significant increase
in North Korea’s ability to deliver a  nuclear weapon at extended ranges.  
Current Assessments.  While specifics on North Korea’s missile
development programs continue to be vague, statements by U.S. military officials in
early 2005 suggest that North Korea’s missile programs continue to evolve. U.S.
Army General Leon LaPorte, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, reportedly stated
in March 2005 that “the regime’s continued development of a three-stage variant of
the Taepo Dong missile, which could be operational within the next decade, could
also provide North Korea with the capability to directly target the United States.”75
General LaPorte also expressed his concerns over North Korea’s medium and
intermediate range missiles and their potential to strike Okinawa, Guam, and possibly
Alaska.76  In open testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April
28, 2005, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director, DIA stated in response to questions
on North Korean missile capabilities that North Korea had the capability to arm a
missile with a nuclear device and that  a two-stage nuclear missile which could reach
portions of the United States was also within North Korean capabilities.77  Admiral
Jacoby qualified these controversial statements during the hearing, saying that
without flight testing, these attributed capabilities were theoretical in nature.78  These
statements, suggesting that North Korea had achieved a nuclear missile capability,
resulted in a great deal of controversy - reportedly “stunning senators” at the hearing
and eliciting a response from the Pentagon later that day suggesting that Admiral
Jacoby had overstated North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities.79
While most experts agree that North Korea’s ballistic missile program is
progressing, others suggest that the North Korean missile program suffers from a
number of significant problems.  Peter Hayes, the Director of the Nautilus Institute
for Security and Sustainability, in Berkeley, California, who specializes in North
Korean nuclear and energy issues, notes that North Korean missiles are unreliable.80
In terms of reliability, he suggests that the combined probability that a North Korean
missile would both take off and then stage as intended was around 49 percent and
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strike by the United States.81  Hayes also maintains that “the North Koreans are
terrible at systems engineering,” and that each new missile type becomes “a new type
of unknown operating characteristic” suggesting that a North Korean missile attack
might look like an “uncontrolled fireworks display.”82  Although there are a variety
of assessments as to the state and viability of North Korea’s long-range missile
program, some suggest that these missiles serve another purpose.  The London-based
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) offers the possibility that North
Korea’s longer range missiles are:
designed more for bargaining leverage and trading for political and economic
benefits than for military use. In a sense, both are probably true - by developing
greater missile capabilities, North Korea can drive up the price for agreeing to
restrain or abandon parts of its missile programme and at the same time be in a
stronger position to test and deploy such systems if negotiations fail.83
Missile Proliferation.  North Korea has been called “the world’s most prolific
exporter of ballistic missiles and related equipment, materials and technology.”84
Over the past 20 years, North Korea is credited with having sold several hundred
Scuds and NoDong missiles, components, related technologies, and production
facilities, primarily to Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya,
Pakistan, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates.  These missile sales - possibly
amounting to several hundred million dollars - constituted a significant portion of
North Korea’s hard currency earnings over the years and likely were also exchanged
with Iran for oil and with Pakistan for nuclear technology.  There is speculation,
however, that revenues from missile sales have been declining in recent years as
some of North Korea’s traditional customers, Iran for example, have developed an
indigenous missile production capability and others such as Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan,
and the United Arab Emirates have been pressured by Washington to end their
missile-related dealings with North Korea. 
A Resumption of Ballistic Missile Test Flights?  On March 3, 2005,
North Korea announced a end to their 1999 self-imposed moratorium on test firing
long-range missiles.85  On May 1, 2005, North Korea launched a short-ranged
ballistic missile - believed to be an upgraded version of a Soviet-era SS-21 - with a
range of about 75 miles into the Sea of Japan, short of the Japanese coast.86  A similar
test in April 2004 of an SS-21 reportedly failed and South Korean defense experts
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Figure 1.
speculate the this upgraded SS-21 has the capability to reach south of Seoul where
U.S. military bases are to be relocated.87  While some do not expect that North Korea
will test longer-range ballistic missiles such as 1998’s Taepo Dong missile test over
the island of Japan due to the political fallout, the possibility exists that North Korea
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Iran
 Iran’s long-range ballistic missile program is the focus of significant interest, largely
due to Iran’s resurgent nuclear program.88  Some experts are concerned that Iran may
develop nuclear-armed ballistic missiles that can not only strike targets throughout
the Middle East - Israel, in particular - but also parts of Europe and beyond.89
Iran’s Space Program?  On January 5, 2004, Iran’s Defense Minister
reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within the next 18 months.90
Although this deadline has passed without a launch, some U.S. intelligence analysts
remain concerned that such a launch -  likely involving a modified Shahab-3 missile -
would not only elevate Iran’s stature but also serve as a “Trojan Horse” “to help Iran
develop both range and warhead improvements to the already upgraded Shahab-3
under the cover of a civilian space program.91  This upgraded Shabab-3, which was
flight tested three to four times between July and October 2004, reportedly has a
number of modifications that suggest that this missile is being modified to
accommodate a nuclear warhead.92  The upgraded Shahab-3, with a more bulbous
nose and up to 15% more propellant capacity, suggests a  reentry vehicle similar to
the Russian SS-9 ICBM.93  Experts also maintain that this new configuration could
facilitate additional modification for the addition of a small solid propellant upper
stage and satellite payload.94  This Shahab version could therefore become a “dual-
use” missile, thereby making it more difficult for intelligence analysts to separate
ballistic missile development activities from space launch ones. 
Nuclear Warhead Development.  Iran is reportedly also developing a
missile reentry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead for use in its Shahab
missiles.95  U.S. officials, commenting after former Secretary of State Colin Powell’s
November 17, 2004, disclosure that Iran was developing nuclear warheads for its
missiles, stated that the warhead is based on an indigenous Iranian design and
includes the “physics package” - the nuclear weapons components designed to fit
inside of the reentry vehicle.96  The anonymous U.S. officials stated the information
on Iranian warhead development “came from reliable intelligence sources” and not
from Iranian opposition groups that have provided unreliable information in the
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past.97  Another report suggests that Iran is smuggling ceramic matrix composite
(CMC) - a composite graphite material that, in addition to a variety of commercial
uses, is considered ideal for use as heat shields on missile reentry vehicles.98
International CMC trading for use in reentry vehicles and missile warheads is
controlled under the Missile Technology Control Regime — a voluntary arrangement
on the export of missiles and associated technologies.99  
Solid Propellant Tests.  On May 31, 2005, Iran reportedly announced that
it had successfully tested a new solid-fuel motor which could be incorporated into the
upgraded Shahab-3, which is currently based on liquid-fuel technology.100  If these
claims are true, this could represent a significant breakthrough for Iran’s ballistic
missile program.  Solid propellant-based missiles, unlike liquid propellant ones, can
be kept in storage for years, require less maintenance, and are generally more reliable
and accurate. In addition, a solid propellant capability is generally considered a pre-
requisite for developing longer range missiles.  The maximum range for a single
stage missile is approximately 2,000 kms and in order to achieve greater ranges, a
two or three stage missile is required.  The in-flight separation and ignition of these
additional stages are  considered  a very complex scientific and engineering processes
and “in order to maintain the accuracy of the missile, it needs to be using solid
fuel.”101
Shahab 4/5?  There has been a great deal of speculation surrounding upgraded
versions of the Shahab 3 - the so-called Shahab-4/5. On October 3, 2002, Iranian
Brigadier General Ahmad Vahid, the chairman of the Iranian Aerospace Industries
Organization, told journalists that Iran “had no plans to develop long-range missiles
in order to strike the United States, since the U.S. is not one of Iran’s strategic
defense targets and instead had oriented its ballistic missile development against its
principal regional adversary - Israel.”102  Some believe that this statement suggests
that Iran will not pursue specific Shahab-4/5 programs as the upgrdaed Shahab-3 is
capable of striking Israel and regional targets. One expert postulates that Iran’s
previously discussed “improved Shahab-3” might in fact be Iran’s way of developing
more capable, longer range Shahab missiles without hanging politically contentious
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India104
India has an extensive missile and space program.  In addition to antitank,
surface-to-air, and air-to-air missiles, it produces SRBMs and is developing MRBMs
and IRBMs.  India’s test of nuclear devices in 1998, its possibly arming some
missiles with nuclear warheads, and  its long-running conflict with Pakistan over
Kashmir make its missile force a cause of concern.  The Prithvi series of liquid fuel
theater missiles includes a 150 km and a 250 km model that are in production and a
350 km model currently in development.  The Dhanush is reportedly a naval version
of the Prithvi with a range of 250 km.  The Agni I reportedly has a 700 - 750 km
range and is both rail and road-mobile.105  The Agni II, also rail and road-mobile, is
said to have a range of at least 1,500 km, much more range than necessary to reach
all of Pakistan.106  India has long refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
as a non-weapon state, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and is not
a partner of the Missile Technology Control Regime or other multilateral export
control mechanisms.  While India claims it needs these strategic weapons to deter
China, many analysts believe that they are a destabilizing factor in South Asia.  India
also obtained the lease of a Russian submarine capable of carrying nuclear-capable
cruise missiles with a 300 km range in December 2002.107  This capability will likely
not only further destabilize the region but will also greatly enhance the survivability
of India’s nuclear weapons by providing them with a triad — a land, air, and sea-
based nuclear weapons delivery capability.
India reportedly tested an Agni I missile on January 9, 2003.108  In September
2003, the Indian government announced that they would create two additional Prithvi
missile groups armed with conventional warheads and an Agni I regiment and an
Agni II regiment which could be armed with nuclear warheads.109  There was also
speculation that India was preparing to test their 3,000 km Agni III missile.  The
Indian government reportedly hinted in October 2003 that they would test the Agni
III as early as November 2003110 but government statements later that month
suggested that a test flight would be postponed until 2004 pending the completion of
additional testing.111  In March 2005, it was reported that the first Agni III test fight
was expected by the end of 2005 and some believe that developmental difficulties as
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well as pressure from the United States have caused delays in the test launch.112  India
also successfully test-fired its supersonic, 290 km range, Brahmos cruise missile on
October 30, 2003. 113  India is also testing its Dhanush naval variant, with a reported
test launch in October 2004 from an underwater container simulating a ballistic
missile submarine launch tube.114  India jointly developed the supersonic Brahmos,
which can carry a 200 kg payload, with Russia.115  In December 2004, Russia and
India agreed to build between 360 and 370 missiles annually, with first deliveries
going to the Indian Armed Forces.116  India reportedly also plans to export the
Brahmos.117 
Pakistan118
While it says it is not in an arms race with India, Pakistan has reacted to India’s
missile programs with its own and has tested nuclear devices following India’s
nuclear tests.  It has received extensive help from China and North Korea in
developing and producing missiles.  China also helped Pakistan with the
development of nuclear weapons.  The Hatf-2 and 3 are solid fuel SRBMs that are
probably based on the Chinese M-11 and M-9 respectively.  The Ghauri-I and
Ghauri-II are reportedly based on (or copies of) North Korea’s Nodong or even its
Taepo Dong-1 missile.  The Shaheen/Ghaznavi series are reportedly solid fuel
missiles of uncertain origin.  The Pakistani missiles and nuclear weapons are said to
constitute a deterrent force against India’s numerically-superior conventional forces,
but are seen by many as greatly increasing the possibility of nuclear  warfare.
Pakistan and India have been characterized by some analysts as having
conducted routine flight tests of their missiles in 2004 - 2005 and in March 2004,
Pakistan made its first flight test of its Shaheen-II missile, a two-stage, solid
propellant missile with a reported range of 2,000 km.119  The Shaheen-II was
reportedly successfully test fired again in March 2005.120
On November 7, 2003, during a meeting in Seoul with South Korean
government officials, Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, reportedly
stated that Pakistan had obtained short-range missiles and technology from North
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Korea but that Pakistan could now make the missiles itself.121  During the same
meeting, he stated that Pakistan had not traded nuclear technology for missiles and
that there was currently “no interaction with North Korea whatsoever on any defense
related matters.”122  Analysts suggest that this statement may indicate that Pakistan
is now capable of producing Ghauri missiles, considered by many experts to be
copies of the North Korean No Dong, indigenously and that publically severing ties
with North Korea might lessen U.S. pressure regarding Pakistani-North Korean
cooperation.  Having publically proclaimed the end to this relationship, Pakistan
would assume considerable risk if they re-initiated missile-related dealings with
North Korea. 
Cruise Missiles123
According to the latest published unclassified assessment from the DOD’s
National Air and Space Intelligence Center:
Proliferation of land attack cruise missiles will expand in the next decade.
At least nine countries will be involved in producing these weapons.  The
majority of new LACMs will be very accurate, conventionally armed, and
available for export.  The high accuracy of many LACMs will allow them
to inflict serious damage on important targets, even when the missiles are
armed only with conventional warheads. U.S. defense systems could be
severely stressed by low-flying stealthy cruise missiles that can
simultaneously attack a target from several directions.124 
U.S. vulnerability to cruise missile attack was highlighted during the 2003 Iraq
War. During the conflict,  U.S. and Kuwaiti Patriot theater missile defense batteries
intercepted and destroyed all nine Iraqi ballistic missiles launched against the
Coalition but failed to detect or intercept the five HY-2/CSSC-3 Seersucker cruise
missiles launched against Kuwait.125  All the more troubling was the fact that the HY-
2/CSSC-3 missiles were developed in the 1970s and are considered large and slow
compared to more modern cruise missiles.  This demonstrated vulnerability could
further the attractiveness of cruise missiles to countries looking for a means to strike
U.S. targets.
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Developmental and Acquisition Efforts.126  As already discussed, China
is developing the HN series of land attack cruise missiles as well as a number of
other anti-ship, and air, ground, submarine and ship-launched cruise missiles.  China
is also reportedly developing a ram-jet powered127 cruise missile (FF-1 and YJ-91)
and has sold YJ-1 and YJ-2 missiles to Iran, where these missiles are now being
indigenously produced under license to the Chinese government.  It is not
unreasonable to assume that China will export more cruise missiles in the future and
that more countries will, in turn, begin building cruise missiles under license, with
some eventually achieving self-sufficiency in cruise missile production.
India has reportedly purchased the Russian SS-N-27 cruise missile for land,
ship, and submarine use in addition to its joint Brahmos program.  There have also
been reports that Taiwan has tested a ramjet powered Hsiung-Feng 3 cruise missile
and that Israel is developing a nuclear armed cruise missile, reports which the Israeli
government denies.  France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom all have either individual or cooperative land attack cruise missile
programs ongoing and, like the Chinese, some of these advanced missiles could be
exported to other countries, further complicating the security environment.
Implications
Based on reported program progress, it is reasonable to conclude that the
development and acquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles continues to remain a
central security goal for a number of countries of concern to the United States.  While
shorter-range ballistic missiles are of concern, particularly in terms of their use on the
battlefield, a number of combat proven and developmental ballistic missile defense
systems — such as the U.S. Patriot and the Israeli Arrow — provide a means to
counter these systems.  China, a country that has had long-range ballistic missiles and
nuclear warheads for a number of decades, appears to be modernizing and upgrading
its capability, not necessarily to  directly rival or surpass the United States but, as
some suggest, as a means to obtain even greater strategic “freedom of action.”  Some
speculate that Iran and North Korea — countries with a significant U.S. military
presence near their borders — are attempting to achieve a basic nuclear missile
capability in order to deter U.S. military action.  Some believe that these countries
in various stages of nuclear missile development can be deterred from further
progress, either through diplomacy or some form of coercion. Others say that, short
of physical destruction of their programs, countries like North Korea and Iran will
eventually achieve the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to various ranges with
ballistic missiles.  Cruise missile programs are far more widespread than ballistic
missile programs, largely due to their relative affordability and the dual use nature
of their technology.  While cruise missiles may not be able to deliver significant
payloads over great distances, their stealth and accuracy afford their possessors a
potential asymmetric advantage. 
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In order to address the implications of progressively improving and diversified
ballistic and cruise missile threats, the United States has relied on nonproliferation
and counterproliferation activities in various combinations and in varied degrees of
application.  Some analysts contend that past Administrations relied too heavily on
nonproliferation activities (which are considerably less expensive and controversial
than many counterproliferation programs) and blame this imbalance for the current
state of missile proliferation.  The current Bush Administration is accused by other
experts as being too heavily skewed in the direction of counterproliferation, as
witnessed by the National Missile Defense Program and the Proliferation Security
Initiative, but still other experts note that much of the emphasis on
counterproliferation is an inevitable result of the events of September 11, 2001.
U.S. Counter and Nonproliferation Policy128
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in
September 2002 calls for “proactive counterproliferation efforts” and “strengthened
nonproliferation efforts” against terrorist and hostile states.129  While missiles are not
singled out in the strategy, they are implicitly part of the Administration’s definition
of WMD.  The December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction goes into far greater detail on how the threat of WMDs and missiles will
be dealt with.130  This strategy explicitly states that “The United States, our friends
and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to
prevent states and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles.”  The primary means
by which this goal is to be achieved is through counterproliferation and
nonproliferation activities.  The strategy states that “effective interdiction is a critical
part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their delivery means.”  Another
approach is the widely publicized concept of preemption.  While preemption has
been an underlying assumption in previous national security strategies, it has
assumed a prominent role in the current strategy.  Some have called for preempting
WMD and missile programs in North Korea and Iran, but the use of eliminating
Iraq’s WMDs as the basis for going to war in Iraq in 2003 and the subsequent
revelation that Iraq had previously eliminated these programs, has likely eliminated
preemption from further practical consideration.   
In the area of nonproliferation, the strategy calls for the “strengthening of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including the support for universal
adherence to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation.”  Also part of this strategy is the implementation of  bilateral and
multilateral agreements to stop the spread of missile proliferation.
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President  Bush on
May 31, 2003, is an international initiative which focuses on the interdiction of
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shipment of WMD and associated delivery systems and technology.131  More than 60
countries currently support the PSI and while details surrounding its implementation
are few — largely attributed to intelligence and security considerations — U.S.
Secretary of State Rice noted that the PSI was responsible for stopping 11 WMD-
related transfers since 2004 - although it is unclear how many of these transfers were
missile-related. 
On June 29, 2005, President Bush issued an unclassified Executive Order titled
“Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their
Supporters”132 intended to freeze assets of individuals or companies in the United
States that are doing business with entities in Iran, North Korea, an Syria suspected
to be involved in WMD proliferation.  The Executive Order Annex contains the
name of eight companies and freezes their U.S. assets and prohibits U.S. citizens or
companies from conducting business transactions with them. 
While there appears to be little emphasis placed on the MTCR and Code of
Conduct by the Administration, the PSI and moves to freeze assets of companies
involved in WMD proliferation suggest that the Administration is embarking on a
more aggressive form of nonproliferation.  While some may consider these moves
confrontational and, in the case of the PSI, somewhat questionable from a legal
perspective, others suggest that traditional treaties and agreements — which generally
are not subscribed to by nations of concern — have done little to deter more
aggressive countries such as North Korea and Iran from advancing their missile
programs. 
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Appendix 1. Ballistic and Land Attack Cruise Missile Inventory133
(See Footnote 3 on page CRS-2 for abbreviations - blank spaces indicate data unknown)
Designation Type Launchers Missiles Range (km) Payload (kg) Motors Status
REPUBLICS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Armenia SS-1 Scud SRBM 8 32 300 1,000 Liquid
Belarus SS-1 Scud SRBM <50 300 1,000 Liquid
SS-21 Scarab SRBM <100 120 482 Solid
SS-25 Sickle ICBM 0 0 10,500 1,000 Solid All  moved to
Russia
Kazakhstan SS-1 Scud SRBM <50 300 1,000
SS-21 Scarab SRBM <50 120 482 Solid
SS-18 Satan ICBM 0 0 11,000 8,800 Liquid All Deactivated
Russia SS-1, SS-1C Scud
Mod 2
SRBM >250 300+ 1,000 Liquid
SS-11 Sego ICBM 0 0 13,000/ 10,600 1,100 Liquid All 
Deactivated
SS-13 Savage ICBM 0 0 9,400 1,800 Solid All Deactivated
SS-17  Spanker ICBM 0 0 10,000 400 Liquid All Deactivated
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Designation Type Launchers Missiles Range (km) Payload (kg) Motors Status
SS-18 Satan ICBM 186 186 9,000/
11,000
8,800 Liquid 24 Deactivated 
SS-19 Stiletto ICBM 170 170 10,000 43,500 Liquid 3 Deactivated
SS-21 Scarab SRBM >200 120 482 Solid
SS-24 Scalpel ICBM 46 46 10,000 40,500 Solid Modernized w/
one warhead
SS-25 Sickle     ICBM 360 360 10,500 1,000 Solid In Service, One
Warhead




AS-2 Kipper ALCM 120 1,000 Turbojet
AS-3 Kangaroo ALCM 650 2,300 Turbojet
AS-15 Kent (Kh-
65SE/Kh-101)
ALCM 782 782 600/3,000 410/150 Turbofan Two Versions
In
Development





SS-N-6 Serb SLBM 16 16 3,000 680 Liquid All Removed
from Subs
SS-N-8 Sawfly SLBM 208 208 7,800/
9,100
3,600 Liquid All Removed
from Subs
SS-N-17 Snipe SLBM 0 0 3,900 1,135 Solid 12 Deactivated
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Designation Type Launchers Missiles Range (km) Payload (kg) Motors Status
SS-N-18 Stingray SLBM 208 208 6,500/
8,000
1,315 Liquid All Removed
from Subs
SS-N-20 Sturgeon SLBM 120 120 8,300 2,270 Solid
SS-N-21 Sampson SLCM 3,000 150 Turbofan
SS-N-23 Skiff SLBM 112 112 8,300 1,360 Liquid
SS-N-24 Scorpion SLCM 4,000 Turbofan Canceled
Turkmenistan SS-1 Scud SRBM <50 100+ 300 1,000 Liquid Possible
Ukraine SS-1 Scud SRBM <100 100+ 300 1,000 Liquid
SS-19 Stiletto ICBM 0 0 10,000 43,500 Liquid 60 Being
Dismantled
SS-21 Scarab SRBM <100 120 482 Solid
SS-24 Scalpel ICBM 0 0 10,000 40,500 Solid 46 Deactivated 
AS-15 Kent ALCM 600/3,000 410/150 Turbofan Reported Sent
to Russia
EUROPE 
Bulgaria SS-1 Scud SRBM 36 300 1,00
SS-23 Spider SRBM 8 500 450 Solid
Czech
Republic
SS-1 Scud SRBM 0 0 300 1,000
SS-21 Scarab SRBM 70/120 482
SS-23 Spider SRBM 0 0 500 450 Solid Scrapped
France SSBS S3D IRBM 0 0 3,500 Solid 18 Deactivated
Sept 1996
S45/S5 IRBM 4,500+ Canceled
CRS-31
Designation Type Launchers Missiles Range (km) Payload (kg) Motors Status
Hades SRBM 15 500 480 In Storage
M-20/M-4 SLBM 80 80 3,000/
5,000
Solid In Service
M-45 (variant of M-
4)
SLBM 5,000 Solid In Service








Turbojet In Service 
SCALP (formerly
Super Apache)
CM 500-800 400 In
Development
ASMP CM 300 Rkt/
Ramjet
In Service




Teseo  Mk3 Dual Role 300 145 Turbojet In
Development
Germany Taurus (KEPD-350) CM 350 500 Turbojet In Dev. with
Sweden 
Greece ATACMS SRBM 40 160 1,670 Solid In Service
Hungary SS-1 Scud SRBM 0 0 300 1,000 Destroyed or
Transferred
Italy Teseo Dual Role 300+ 160 Turbojet In
Development,
Stealth Otomat
Netherlands ATACMS SRBM 160 1,670 Solid In Service
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Poland SS-1 Scud SRBM 0 0 300 1,000 Liquid Transferred





Slovakia SS-1 Scud SRBM 300 1,000
SS-21 Scarab SRBM <50 70/120 482
SS-23 Spider SRBM <50 500
Spain Alada CM 200+ 500 Turbojet Proposed













SLCM 1,600 320 Solid
Storm Shadow CM 500-2,000 250-400 400 Turbojet In Service
CHINA
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CSS-2 (DF-3/3A) MRBM 6-10 14-18 2,790 + 2,150 Liquid In Service
CSS-3 (DF-4) ICBM 10-14 20-24 5,470+ 2,200 Liquid In Service
CSS-4 (DF-5/5A) ICBM 20 20 8,460+ 3,200 Liquid In Service
CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBM 34-38 19-23 1,770+ 600 Solid In Service
CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SLBM 10-14 10-14 1,770+ 600 Solid In Service
CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9) SRBM 70-80 230-240 600 500 Solid In Service
CSS-7 (DF-11/M-11) SRBM 100-120 420-460 300 500 Solid In Service
CSS-8 (M-7/8610) SRBM 150 190 Solid In Service









DF-41 ICBM 12,000 800 Solid In
Development
Xiong Ying ? LACM 1,500-2,000 Turbofan In
Development
REST OF THE WORLD
Afghanistan SS-1 Scud-B SRBM <50 300 1,000 Liquid Status
unknown
Algeria SS-1 Scud-B SRBM 300 1,000 Liquid
Argentina Alacran SRBM 200 500 Solid
Brazil MB/EE-150 SRBM 150 500 Solid Terminated
SS-300 SRBM 300 1,000 Solid Terminated
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SS-600 SRBM 600 500 Solid Terminated
Congo, Dem.
Rep. Of
SS-1 Scud-B SRBM 300 1,000 Liquid Possibly
Received from
Iran
Egypt SS-1 Scud-B SRBM <50 100+ 300 1,000 Liquid In Service
Scud derivative 
(Project T)
SRBM 450 Liquid In Service?
Scud-C SRBM 500 700 Liquid ?
Vector (Condor II) SRBM 800-1,000 Solid Possibly in
Development
India Prithvi-150 SRBM 75 150 800-1,000 Liquid In Service
Prithvi-250 SRBM 250 500-750 Liquid In Production




SLBM 250 Liquid In
Development





Agni II IRBM 3,000 1,000 In
Development









Designation Type Launchers Missiles Range (km) Payload (kg) Motors Status
Sagarika SLCM or
SLBM
300 500 Solid In
Development
Iran CSS-8 (M-7/8610) SRBM <50 200 150 190 Solid In Service
CSS-6 (M-9) SRBM 600 500 Solid Possible




SRBM 130 500 or 190 Solid In Service
Mushak-160 SRBM 160 190 Solid In Service
Mushak-200 SRBM 200 500 Solid In
Development













Shahab-5 ICBM 10,000 Possibly in
Development
SS-1 Scud-B SRBM <50 200+ 300 1,000 Liquid In Service
Iran 7000 (Scud-C
variant)
SRBM <50 100+ 600/
700
500 Liquid In Service
Zelzal (Earthquake) 1 SRBM 100-150 Solid In Production
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Zelzal 2 SRBM 350-400 Solid In Production









Israel Jericho 1 (YA-1) SRBM ~50 500 750 Solid In Service












Popeye Turbo ASM 350 895 Turbojet
Delilah
Derivative (Star-1)




ALCM 100 675 None In
Development
Korea, North Scud-B variant SRBM 12 100+ 300 1,000 Liquid In Service
Scud-C SRBM 100+ 500 700 Liquid In Service
Nodong MRBM 1,000-1300 1,000 Liquid In Service 










Designation Type Launchers Missiles Range (km) Payload (kg) Motors Status
SS-N-6 Variant MRBM/
IRBM
5 <10 3,000 - 3,600 680 Liquid In
Development




Korea, South NHK-1 (Baekgom) SRBM 180 300 Solid In Service
NHK-A (Hyon Mu) SRBM 180 300 In Service
NHK Extended
Range
SRBM 300 Tested at
reduced range
ATACMS SRBM 111 160 1,670 Solid
Pakistan Hatf-1 Rocket 80-100 500 Solid In Service
Hatf-2 SRBM 280 500 Solid In
Development
Hatf-3 (Possibly the
Tarmuk, a version of
M-9)
SRBM 750-800 500 Solid Indian press
reports M-9-
type project
M-11 (CSS-7/DF11) SRBM 40? 300 500 Solid Missiles or
parts and
factory from
China.  May be
basis for Hatf-2
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Ghauri (or Mk III or
HATF-V)
MRBM 1,000-1,500 600 or 700 Liquid In
Development




Ghauri II (or HATF-
VI 
MRBM 1,500-2,300 700 Liquid In
Development













Abdali MRBM 2,500 In
Development
Saudi Arabia CSS-2 (DF-3) MRBM 30 ~50 2,400/
2,800
2,150 Liquid Possibly not
operational




LACM 300 Turbojet In
Development
Syria SS-21 SRBM 36+ 70 482 Solid In Service
SS-1 Scud-B SRBM 100s 300 1,000 Liquid In Service
Scud-C SRBM 50+ 600 500 Liquid In Service
Designation Type Launchers Missiles Range (km) Payload (kg) Motors Status




SRBM 130 400 Liquid In Service
Tien Chi  (Sky
Halberd)








SS-1 Scud-B SRBM 6 300 1,000
Black Shahine
(Version of Apache)
ALCM 140-300 520 Bought From
Matra Bae
Dynamics
Vietnam SS-1 Scud-B SRBM <50 300 1,000 Liquid In Service
Yemen SS-21 SRBM <50 24? 70 482 Solid In Service
SS-1 Scud-B SRBM <50 18? 300 1,000 Liquid In Service
